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RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Douglas Richards, the former Director of 
Human Resources for the government of Luzerne County, 
Pennsylvania, appeals the sentence he received after pleading 
guilty to accepting a bribe.  Richards objects to the District 
Court’s enhancement of his sentence pursuant to § 
2C1.2(b)(3) of the Sentencing Guidelines for being a 
government official in a high-level decision-making or 
sensitive position.  His appeal requires us to determine, as a 
matter of first impression in our Court, the standard of review 
we apply to a district court’s application of a sentencing 
enhancement pursuant to § 2C1.2(b)(3).  We conclude that 
the clearly erroneous standard is appropriate when reviewing 
a district court’s determination that the enhancement under § 
2C1.2(b)(3) applies based on the facts presented.  Under that 
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standard, we hold that the District Court did not clearly err in 
finding that Richards was a public official in a high-level 
decision-making or sensitive position.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm. 
 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
 
 In December 2009, Richards was charged with one 
count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) for accepting a 
bribe in excess of $1,000 but less than $5,000 in connection 
with assistance given by Richards to Continental Consultants, 
a New York consulting firm interested in contracting with 
Luzerne County.  Richards accepted $1,000 and free New 
York Mets tickets from Continental Consultants.  In 
exchange, he helped Continental Consultants to obtain a 
contract with Luzerne County to provide temporary 
employment services for individuals hired to perform clean-
up work in the aftermath of a 2006 flood.  Continental 
Consultants paid Richards because he “got the ball rolling” on 
the project and assisted in preparing the paperwork for the 
contract.  PSR at ¶ 19.  Richards also “did all the 
administrative work for Continental Consultants’ contract 
with Luzerne County.”  (App. at 26.) 
 Richards pled guilty to violating § 666(a)(1)(B).  In the 
Presentence Report, the probation officer recommended a 
sentence of fifteen to twenty-one months’ imprisonment.  
This recommendation was based on § 2C1.2(a)(1), the 
applicable guideline for a violation of § 666(a)(1)(B), which 
set the base offense level at eleven.  The probation officer 
then added two levels pursuant to § 2C1.2(b)(1) because the 
offense involved more than one gratuity.  Next, the probation 
officer added four levels pursuant to § 2C1.2(b)(3) because 
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the offense involved a public official in a high-level decision-
making or sensitive position.  The officer then subtracted 
three levels for Richards’s acceptance of responsibility 
pursuant to § 3E1.1.  The resulting offense level was fourteen.  
With a criminal history placing him in Category I, the 
advisory sentencing range was therefore fifteen to twenty-one 
months.   
 Richards was sentenced on December 13, 2010 to 
fifteen months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised 
release.  At the sentencing hearing, Richards objected to the 
four-level enhancement pursuant to § 2C1.2(b)(3).  That 
enhancement provides: 
If the offense involved an elected public official 
or any public official in a high-level decision-
making or sensitive position, increase by 4 
levels.  If the resulting offense level is less than 
level 15, increase to level 15. 
U.S.S.G. § 2C1.2(b)(3).  The commentary to that section, in 
turn, provides: 
(A) Definition.—“High-level decision-making or 
sensitive position” means a position 
characterized by a direct authority to make 
decisions for, or on behalf of, a government 
department, agency, or other government entity, 
or by a substantial influence over the decision-
making process. 
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(B) Examples.—Examples of a public official in 
a high-level decision-making position include a 
prosecuting attorney, a judge, an agency 
administrator, a law enforcement officer, and 
any other public official with a similar level of 
authority. Examples of a public official who 
holds a sensitive position include a juror, a law 
enforcement officer, an election official, and any 
other similarly situated individual. 
Id. at cmt. n.3.  Had that enhancement not been applied, 
Richards would have faced an advisory sentencing range of 
six to twelve months.     
Richards argued that he was not a public official in a 
high-level decision-making or sensitive position because: (1) 
he could not hire or fire anyone; (2) he could not bind the 
County; (3) he could not act officially on the County’s behalf; 
(4) he had administrative, not policymaking, duties; (5) he 
reported to superiors, who, in turn, reported to the County 
Commissioners; and (6) the sentencing court did not apply the 
high-level government official enhancement to Richards’s 
superior, William Brace, who was also implicated in this 
bribery scheme. 
 Richards did acknowledge, however, that, as part of 
his job duties, he would refer three or four of the top 
candidates for a job to the County Commissioners for their 
ultimate hiring.  He also administered his own department 
and made many different types of recommendations to his 
superiors, the Deputy County Clerk, the County Clerk, and 
the County Commissioners.   
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At sentencing, the Government introduced the job 
description for Richards’s position as an exhibit in support of 
applying the enhancement under § 2C1.2(b)(3).  According to 
that description, Richards was “responsible for designing, 
implementing and maintaining a centralized Human Resource 
Department.”  He provided “leadership and oversight of all 
Personnel Department functions.”  He also was responsible 
for “writ[ing], maintain[ing] and apply[ing] the County 
policies and guidelines by administering and directing a 
comprehensive human resource program, formulating and 
recommending policies, regulations, and practices for 
carrying out programs, consulting and advising the County 
staff to coordinate the various phases of the policies, 
practices, ordinances, and resolutions.”  (App. at 55-56.)  
Although he agreed that the job description was accurate, 
Richards contended that it did not, in fact, support application 
of the enhancement.  He submitted a flow chart indicating the 
hierarchy of officials in the Luzerne County government as 
evidence that he was not in a high-level decision-making or 
sensitive position.  According to that chart, Richards first 
reported to the Deputy Clerk, who in turn reported to the 
Chief Clerk.  Together, the Deputy Clerk and Chief Clerk 
reported to the Board of Commissioners.   
The District Court concluded that Richards was subject 
to the enhancement under § 2C1.2(b)(3).  The District Court 
sentenced Richards to fifteen months’ imprisonment and two 
years of supervised release.  Richards filed a timely notice of 
appeal.1
                                            
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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II.  Discussion 
On appeal, Richards contends that the District Court 
erred in finding him subject to the enhancement because, 
although he was a public official, he did not occupy a high-
level decision-making or sensitive position.  Before we can 
determine whether the District Court was correct in applying 
the enhancement, however, we must first decide under what 
standard we are to review the District Court’s decision — de 
novo, abuse of discretion, or clear error.   
A. Standard of Review 
Richards argues that de novo review is warranted 
because the question before us involves an interpretation of 
the Sentencing Guidelines.  See, e.g., United States v. Grier, 
475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (exercising 
plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines).  Richards points out that the essential 
facts regarding the nature of his employment are not in 
dispute; therefore, de novo review is appropriate because 
whether those facts fit within the definition of the 
enhancement necessarily requires the court to interpret that 
definition.  We disagree.   
While we review de novo a district court’s 
interpretation of the Guidelines, here, the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Guidelines is not really at issue.  
Richards does not quarrel with the District Court’s 
articulation of what it means to be a government official in a 
high-level decision-making or sensitive position, for the 
District Court used the definition of the enhancement exactly 
as it is recited in the Guidelines.  Rather, Richards disagrees 
with the District Court’s conclusion that the facts regarding 
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his employment fit within the Guidelines definition of a 
government official in a high-level decision-making or 
sensitive position.  This is not properly characterized as an 
issue of Guidelines interpretation as Richards urges.  
Guided by the Supreme Court’s instruction in Buford 
v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001), we believe that a more 
deferential standard of review is appropriate where, as here, 
we consider a district court’s application of the Guidelines to 
a specific set of facts, that is, where the district court 
determined whether the facts “fit” within what the Guidelines 
prescribe.  In Buford, the Supreme Court addressed the 
standard that a court of appeals should apply in reviewing a 
district court’s determination that an offender’s prior 
convictions were “functionally consolidated,” or “related,” 
for purposes of sentencing.  In concluding that deferential 
review was appropriate, the Court focused on the “relative 
institutional advantages enjoyed by the district court in 
making the type of determination at issue.”  Id. at 64 
(citations omitted).  It reasoned that a district court was in a 
better position to decide whether various convictions were 
related, and thus should be consolidated, in part because the 
district court saw many more consolidations.  Id.  The Court 
observed, further, that “factual nuance may closely guide the 
legal decision” of whether to consolidate convictions, “with 
legal results depending heavily upon an understanding of the 
significance of case-specific details.”  Id. at 65 (citations 
omitted).  Finally, the Court found significant that the 
question before it was not a “generally recurring, purely legal 
matter, such as interpreting a set of legal words, say, those of 
an individual guideline, in order to determine their basic 
intent,” which a court of appeals may be better suited to 
answer and would thus warrant less deferential review.  Id.  
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“Rather, the question at issue grows out of, and is bounded 
by, case-specific detailed factual circumstances,” which 
“limits the value of appellate court precedent” because the 
next court to consider the issue will have a different set of 
facts before it.  Id. at 65-66.  These considerations, the Court 
concluded, weighed in favor of deferential review.2
                                            
2 We should note that the Court also based its holding in part 
on the existence of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which requires 
courts of appeals to “accept the findings of fact of the district 
court unless they are clearly erroneous” and to “give due 
deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines 
to the facts.”  Subsequently, the Court decided United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005), in which it excised § 
3742(e) because it contained cross-references to the also-
excised provision of the United States Code making the 
Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).  In so doing, 
the Court was particularly troubled by the provision in § 
3742(e) requiring de novo review of departures from the 
applicable Guidelines range because it reinforced the 
mandatory nature of the Guidelines, but it expressed no 
concerns about the provisions calling for deferential review of 
findings of fact and application of the Guidelines to the facts.  
542 U.S. at 261.  Then, in Grier, we recognized that § 
3742(e) had been excised, see 475 F.3d at 564, but 
nevertheless held that, given the nature of the inquiry and 
relative institutional advantage, we would continue to apply 
clear error review to fact-findings by a district court, see id. at 
569-70.  We do not view the excision of § 3742(e) as 
undermining the Court’s reasoning in Buford.  In fact, in Rita 
v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 361-62 (2007), Justice Stevens 
observed that Booker did not disturb “the portions of § 
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These same considerations guide our decision here.  A 
district court undoubtedly deals with more applications of § 
2C1.2(b)(3) than does a court of appeals.  A trial judge’s 
experience with this type of issue at sentencing weighs in 
favor of applying a more deferential standard of review.  
Additionally, the facts which illuminate the nature and scope 
of an individual’s position within a government entity will 
closely guide the decision whether to apply the enhancement, 
for it is on those facts’ particular “fit” within the definition of 
the enhancement that the district court’s decision to apply the 
enhancement will turn.  A district court must determine, 
based on the facts, whether the defendant possesses “direct 
authority to make decisions” for a government entity.  
Similarly, the facts will guide a district court’s determination 
whether a defendant exercises “substantial influence over the 
decision-making process.”  § 2C1.2(b)(3) cmt. n.3.   
Richards, however, urges that we follow United States 
v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990), and review the 
issue here de novo.  In Stephenson, the court reviewed de 
novo whether the defendant, an export licensing officer in the 
Department of Commerce who decided whether to approve 
applications to export high-technology equipment to the 
Soviet Union and China, qualified as a government official in 
a high-level decision-making or sensitive position within the 
                                                                                                  
3742(e) requiring appellate courts to . . . ‘accept the findings 
of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous,’ 
and to ‘give due deference to the district court’s application 
of the guidelines to the facts.’”  (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)).  Thus, we view § 3742(e) as 
still calling for “due deference” to be given to a district 
court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts. 
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meaning of the enhancement.  Id. at 878.3
We therefore decline to apply de novo review.  Left 
with a choice between reviewing for clear error or abuse of 
discretion, “‘the nature of the question presented’” persuades 
us that, in order to give the appropriate level of deference, we 
should review for clear error, rather than for abuse of 
discretion.  Buford, 532 U.S. at 63 (quoting Koon v. United 
States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996)).  As we explain more fully 
below, the choice between the two standards here may be a 
distinction without a difference, for where the determination 
is fact-driven, a district court will have abused its discretion 
in imposing a sentence when it bases its decision on clearly 
erroneous factual conclusions.  United States v. Wise, 515 
F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).  
  But Stephenson 
provides no reasoning as to why de novo review is 
appropriate with respect to the enhancement; the court simply 
stated that “this issue presents a question of law reviewed de 
novo.”  Id. at 877-78.  Without any reasoning or additional 
case law as to why this inquiry should be reviewed de novo, 
and because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Buford, we 
will not rely on Stephenson as Richards urges and conduct de 
novo review. 
                                            
3 At the time the defendant in Stephenson was sentenced, the 
enhancement was set forth in § 2C1.1(b)(2), and called for an 
eight-level increase in the offense level “‘[i]f the offense 
involved a bribe for the purpose of influencing . . . any 
official holding a high level decisionmaking or sensitive 
position.’”  895 F.2d at 877 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)).  
At that time, the Guidelines did not define a high-level 
decision-making or sensitive position.  Id.   
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Clear error review is appropriate when the legal issue 
decided by the district court is, in essence, a factual question.  
For example, in United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 638, 644 
(3d Cir. 2011), we held that we would review for clear error a 
district court’s determination whether a false statement in a 
warrant application was made with reckless disregard for the 
truth.  We concluded that this standard of review was 
appropriate in part because the legal test, which provides that 
an assertion is made with reckless disregard for the truth 
when “viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or 
had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information 
he reported,” essentially requires a court to make a factual 
determination as to whether “‘serious doubts’ or ‘obvious 
reasons’ existed.”  Id. at 645 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The answer to that inquiry, we observed, 
“is a matter of fact.  Serious doubts exist or they do not; a 
reason for doubt exists or it does not and is obvious or is not.”  
Id.   
We reasoned that clear error review is appropriate 
because when the legal issue involves “a ‘strictly factual test,’ 
such that once the test is stated no legal reasoning is 
necessary to the resolution of the issue,” “[t]he considerations 
related to legal correctness and the development of 
precedent” that favor a less deferential standard of review are 
of diminished concern.  Id. at 644.  “At the same time, the 
factual nature of the determination favors the trial court’s 
experience and first-hand observation of testimony and other 
evidence.”  Id.  An appellate court’s review of these kinds of 
decisions, moreover, “will not be of much use in future cases 
with different fact patterns.”  Id. at 645.   
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As in Brown, the legal test we are applying here is in 
essence a factual inquiry.  That test is set forth in the 
definition of a government official in a high-level decision-
making or sensitive position, and under that test, a district 
court simply needs to find facts that will answer — either yes 
or no — whether the government official possesses “direct 
authority to make decisions” for a government entity or 
whether the official possesses “substantial influence over the 
decision-making process.”  § 2C1.2(b)(3) cmt. n.3(A).  The 
answer to these questions are, as in Brown, matters of fact; 
either a government official will or will not possess “direct 
authority to make decisions,” or will or will not possess 
“substantial influence over the decision-making process.”  Id.  
These facts will form the sole basis for the district court’s 
conclusion whether to subject a defendant to an enhancement 
under § 2C1.2(b)(3).  The highly factual nature of this 
inquiry, and a trial court’s relative institutional advantages in 
conducting it, weigh in favor of clear error review.  
Moreover, our review of these decisions will be of little help 
in future cases because the next government official 
inevitably will be in a different position and have different 
job responsibilities than the defendant does here.   
We are not alone in concluding that whether an 
individual is a public official in a “high-level decision-
making or sensitive position” is a factual determination, 
reviewable on appeal for clear error.  The Courts of Appeals 
for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have so concluded, although 
without extensive discussion of the issue.  See United States 
v. Mack, 159 F.3d 208, 220 (6th Cir. 1998) (reviewing district 
court’s application of public official in high-level decision-
making or sensitive position enhancement for clear error); 
United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 969 (4th Cir. 1995) 
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(reasoning that the high-level decision-making or sensitive 
position enhancement is reviewed for clear error because it 
“turns primarily on fact”).     
Our decision to apply clear error review is further 
supported by the fact that many other sentencing 
enhancements, which call for similarly factual 
determinations, are also reviewed for clear error.  For 
example, we and other courts of appeals review a district 
court’s decision to apply the “organizer or leader” 
enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, for clear error.  See United 
States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 216-17 (3d Cir. 2009).4
                                            
4 See also United States v. Snow, 663 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (reviewing application of the organizer or leader 
enhancement for clear error); United States v. Rodriguez-
Ramos, 663 F.3d 356, 364 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); United 
States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1200 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(same); United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 1304 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (reviewing application of organizer or leader 
enhancement for clear error because it involves a “factual 
determination”); United States v. Garcia-Pastrana, 584 F.3d 
351, 393 (1st Cir. 2009) (reviewing application of organizer 
or leader enhancement for clear error); United States v. Gotti, 
459 F.3d 296, 349 (2d Cir. 2006) (reviewing application of 
organizer or leader enhancement for clear error because it is a 
“predominantly factual” question); United States v. Hankton, 
432 F.3d 779, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (reviewing application of 
the organizer or leader enhancement for clear error); United 
States v. Sayles, 296 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); 
United States v. Berry, 258 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(same); United States v. Miller, 161 F.3d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 
1998) (same); United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 655 (5th 
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While that Guideline does not define “organizer” or “leader,” 
it provides factors for the sentencing court to consider when 
determining whether a defendant qualifies for the 
enhancement, such as the defendant’s “exercise of decision 
making authority, . . . the degree of participation in planning or 
organizing the offense, . . . and the degree of control and 
authority exercised over others.”  § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4.  These 
factors closely resemble the definition of the enhancement at 
issue here, because they both require the district court to 
examine the individual’s ability to make decisions or influence 
decision-making.  See § 2C1.2(b)(3) cmt. n.3 (explaining that 
a high-level decision-making or sensitive position is one 
characterized by “direct authority to make decisions” or 
“substantial influence over the decision-making process”).   
Similarly, we review for clear error a district court’s 
reduction of a defendant’s base offense level pursuant to § 
3B1.2 of the Guidelines for being a “minimal participant” or 
“minor participant” in criminal activity.  See United States v. 
Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1207 (3d Cir. 1994).  A “minimal 
participant” is one who is “among the least culpable of those 
involved,” and a “minor participant” is one “who is less 
culpable than most other participants, but whose role could 
not be described as minimal.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. nn.4-5.  
This sentencing adjustment thus requires a sentencing court to 
closely consider the role the defendant played in the offense, 
a necessarily factual inquiry.  To our knowledge, every other 
court of appeals joins us in reviewing the application of the 
                                                                                                  
Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 
1528 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same). 
 
16 
 
reduction under § 3B1.2 for clear error.5
We note that we have made general pronouncements 
in the past that we review a district court’s application of the 
Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(reviewing a district court’s “application of the Guidelines to 
the facts for abuse of discretion”); United States v. Tupone, 
442 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We review the District 
Court’s application of the Guidelines to facts for abuse of 
discretion.”).  That is correct, and appropriate, where there is 
room for interpretation as to whether the facts satisfy an 
essentially legal test, or where a district court can exercise 
some discretion in deciding whether to apply particular 
Guideline provisions.  However, where, as here, the particular 
  These examples 
demonstrate that where, as here, sentencing adjustments 
require a district court to closely examine a set of facts and 
determine whether they fit within the definition of the 
adjustment before deciding whether to apply the adjustment, 
we should review that decision for clear error only.   
                                            
5 See also United States v. Leiskunas, 656 F.3d 732, 739 (7th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. McElwee, 646 F.3d 328, 346 (5th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Mitchell, 613 F.3d 862, 870 (8th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 
1320 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rosa-Carino, 615 
F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 
331, 352 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Groenendal, 557 
F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Tankersley, 
537 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Martinez, 512 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Castano, 234 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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Guideline in question sets forth a predominantly fact-driven 
test, review for clear error is more appropriate.  In this case, 
the abuse of discretion standard does not “fit as well” with the 
inquiry before us, because “[t]he question is not whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in choosing among 
different courses of action.  Instead, it is whether the Court 
perceived the facts correctly.”  United States v. Zats, 298 F.3d 
182, 185 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Harry T. Edwards & Linda 
A. Elliott, Federal Standards of Review ch. I.E (2007) 
(explaining that the abuse of discretion standard generally 
applies to a decision “committed to a trial judge’s discretion,” 
i.e., “a decision with respect to which Congress or the courts 
have decided that there is no single right or wrong answer, 
but rather a range of acceptable choices”).  Here, our role is 
more appropriately described as determining whether the 
District Court clearly erred in its determination that the facts 
fit within the meaning of § 2C1.2(b)(3), rather than whether it 
abused its discretion by adopting one set of factual findings 
instead of another. 
As noted above, our decision to apply clear error, 
rather than abuse of discretion, review, is, however, not very 
significant.  The differences that would result under the 
different standards of review are few, if any.  That is because 
a district court would “abuse its discretion” if it based its 
decision on clearly erroneous facts.  See Wise, 515 F.3d at 
217 (“[I]f the asserted procedural error is purely factual, our 
review is highly deferential and we will conclude there has 
been an abuse of discretion only if the district court’s findings 
are clearly erroneous.”); United States v. Legros, 529 F.3d 
470, 474 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The abuse-of-discretion standard 
incorporates de novo review of questions of law (including 
interpretation of the Guidelines) and clear-error review of 
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questions of fact.”).  Thus, if we reviewed application of the 
enhancement at issue here under the abuse of discretion 
standard, we would be reviewing the factual findings 
supporting application of the enhancement for clear error in 
any event.  And we would find that a district court abused its 
discretion in applying the enhancement based on a particular 
set of facts only if those facts were clearly erroneous. 
Therefore, we will review the District Court’s 
application of the enhancement pursuant to § 2C1.2(b)(3) for 
clear error.  
B. Application of the Enhancement 
Richards contends that he is not subject to the 
enhancement because he did not possess the requisite power 
to make decisions for a government entity, nor the ability to 
influence decision-making by other government officials.  He 
relies principally on Stephenson and United States v. Alter, 
788 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), but that reliance is 
misplaced because those cases do not provide useful 
comparisons to the facts of his case. 
In Stephenson, the court concluded that the defendant, 
an export licensing officer in the Department of Commerce, 
was not subject to the enhancement.  Although his job of 
deciding whether to approve applications to export high-
technology equipment to the Soviet Union and China 
“involved some degree of discretion and required him to 
possess a security clearance,” the court concluded that he was 
not different “from a multitude of personnel in the federal 
service.”  895 F.2d at 878.  Richards urges that, unlike the 
defendant in Stephenson, he was not in a position to bargain 
for cash in exchange for awarding an export license.  But this 
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fact-based comparison is unhelpful; the issue is not whether 
Richards could provide something of value to another.  
Rather, the inquiry must be focused on whether he could 
exercise “a substantial influence over the decision-making 
process” in the Luzerne County government.  U.S.S.G. § 
3C1.2(b)(3) cmt. n.3(A).  The District Court here concluded 
that he could. 
In Alter, the court concluded that the director of a 
halfway house within the federal Bureau of Prisons was not 
subject to the enhancement.  788 F. Supp. at 767.  As director, 
Alter was eleven levels removed in the bureaucratic chain of 
command from the highest director of the Bureau of Prisons, 
and Alter could not impose major disciplinary sanctions 
without referring the cases to his superiors.  Id.  The court 
reasoned that “although Alter possessed a sensitive position, 
some degree of discretion, and de facto authority, these 
characteristics do not render one a ‘high-level’ government 
official.”  Id.  Richards argues that unlike Alter, he did not 
have the authority to control inmates’ freedoms.  Again, this 
comparison is unhelpful.   The relevant inquiry is not whether 
Richards could control inmates’ freedoms, but whether 
Richards could exercise substantial influence over a decision-
making process.  Again, the District Court concluded that he 
could. 
We conclude that the District Court did not clearly err 
in finding Richards subject to the enhancement.  Richards 
admitted that, as part of his job duties, he would refer three or 
four of the top candidates for a job to the County 
Commissioners for their ultimate hiring.  He also 
administered his own department and made recommendations 
to his superiors, the Deputy County Clerk, the County Clerk, 
and the County Commissioners.  Moreover, the job 
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description, the accuracy of which Richards did not contest, 
supports application of the enhancement.  According to the 
description, Richards was “responsible for designing, 
implementing and maintaining a centralized Human Resource 
Department.”  He also was responsible for “writ[ing], 
maintain[ing] and apply[ing] the County policies and 
guidelines by administering and directing a comprehensive 
human resource program, formulating and recommending 
policies, regulations, and practices for carrying out programs, 
consulting and advising the County staff to coordinate the 
various phases of the policies, practices, ordinances, and 
resolutions.”  (App. at 55-56.)  The District Court did not 
clearly err in concluding that these job duties and 
responsibilities evidenced Richards’s ability to substantially 
influence the decision-making process.6
                                            
6 We also reject Richards’s argument that the District Court 
erred in applying the enhancement to him because the District 
Court did not apply it to Richards’s supervisor, William 
Brace.  Richards does not support his argument with any 
comparative evidence and has not demonstrated that he is 
similarly situated to Brace for sentencing purposes.  Without 
showing that Brace’s “circumstances exactly paralleled” 
Richards’s, “a court should not consider sentences imposed 
on defendants in other cases in the absence of such a 
showing” by Richards.  United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 
150, 161 n.7 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also United States v. Robinson, 603 
F.3d 230, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a defendant’s 
argument that his sentence was unreasonable in light of the 
fact that his co-defendant was not subject to the same 
enhancements that he was; we could not conclude that the 
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III.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                                                                                  
defendant’s sentence was unreasonable based solely on the 
fact that the court applied the enhancement to one defendant 
but not to the other).  Merely pointing out the difference 
between his sentence and Brace’s sentence does not establish 
that the District Court clearly erred in concluding that the 
enhancement should be applied to Richards. 
